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Summary
This paper is a short review of Mamoon (2007) analysis on inequality where it is 
contrasted with growth. The economic processes or institutional dynamics that are good 
for growth may not be a priority if inequalities are the prime consideration. For example 
rule of law and control for corruption are the most salient factors to mitigate inequality 
but though they are also good for growth, it is good regulation that takes the lead in 
growth promotion. China has been benefitting from good market regulation - a pro 
capitalist economic tool kit while suffering from rising inequality that may be due to less 
emphasis on control for corruption.
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1.  Income Polarization as a Contemporary Incidence 
The problem of poverty can not be separated from the way in which growth is achieved.  
Hence, today the principle issue in pro poor growth debate also relates to inequality. 
Recent literature suggests that international trade and strong institutions1 are the key 
determinants of growth ( i.e, see Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Rodrik et al, 2004; Glaeser et 
al, 2004a, Mamoon and Murshed, 2005). It is important to look at the different 
institutional setups; countries may have while working along with the surge of 
globalization. For example, India is a thriving democracy but China, South Korea and 
Taiwan have been growing under one-party dictatorships, the last two eventually turning 
to democracy. Recently, Pakistan has become one of the fastest growing economies of 
the region, even surpassing India, under the one man rule of General Musharraf. Among 
the transition economies, rapid economic growth was achieved by Kazakhastan under 
Nazarbaev. Here one may conveniently assume that these countries have performed well 
under market friendly policies and thus successfully achieved robust economic 
1 In this paper we have assumed education, which would otherwise be considered as a proxy for human 
capital, as a social institution.
performance. However the analogy is not that simple. Market friendly policies may not 
work in the absence of good institutions. The failure of Russian economy and its reform 
process can be attributed to the lack of a supportive legal, regulatory and political 
apparatus. In Latin America little attention has been paid to the mechanisms of social 
insurance and to the safety nets which has resulted in the dissatisfaction with market 
oriented reforms. It may also be the case that some institutions may be more important 
than others. For example, even pro-market dictators can secure property rights as a matter 
of policy choice (Glaeser, 2004a). Similarly, stronger social institutions lead to improved 
government functioning: “Education is needed for courts to operate and to empower 
citizens to engage with government institutions (Ibid, 2004: 3)”.
Partly due to the recession in the 1980s, which hit the poor harder than the rich, 
inequality in most Latin American states except for three (Colombia, Uruguay and Costa 
Rica) witness sharp rises. Gini coefficients in Latin America have been ranged between 
0.45 and 0.60 since early 1950s, which are among the highest in the world. The sharp 
income dispersion has been rooted in a highly unequal distribution of land and 
educational opportunities (Cornia et al, 2004). 
In China income concentration has been rising rapidly since 1985 so that the Gini 
coefficient reached 0.43 by 1995 and remained more or less at the same level until 
recently. The rise in income disparity can be attributed to a rise in urban-rural divide 
arising from a faster expansion of urban activities amid active participation of China in 
international markets. Among South East Asian economies, the Gini coefficient for 
Indonesia increased to 0.38 by 1997 from 0.32 in 1987-90. In South Asia, inequality also 
followed a U-shaped pattern, though it was less pronounced. In India, the experience of 
1990s points to a moderate rise in both urban and rural inequality and a larger rise in 
overall inequality due to widening gap between urban and rural areas. In 1990s the urban 
inequality rose to 0.36. The Gini coefficient in Pakistan rose from 0.39 in 1960s to 0.41 
in 1990s. Much like India, the rise in overall inequality is attributed to a sharp rise in 
rural inequalities. Inequality in Sub Saharan Africa has been among the highest in world. 
There is some evidence of falling urban-rural gap but there is rising intra urban and at 
times intra rural inequalities. For example, in Tanzania the Gini coefficient for rural 
inequality rose from 0.53 in early 1980s to 0.76 in early 1990s. Similarly for Kenya, the 
rural inequalities increased by 9 points from 1980 to 1992 and stand at 0.49 (Ibid, 2004).
2. Inequality and the Inter-dependency Factors:
Many recent studies ( i.e., see Chen and Ravallion , 2003; Cockburn, 2002; Friedman, 
2000; Lofgren, 1999) show that international trade is significantly related with inequality 
while institutions and integration are also endogenous (i.e., Rodrik et al, 2004). Any 
empirical analysis which takes institutions as a pure exogenous factor while analysing its 
effects on inequality may lead to miss-specification bias. Here on the line of Ridrik et al 
(2004), we assume geography is a pure endogenous concept.
Chong and Gradstein (2004) find strong evidence of bi-directional causality between 
institutions and inequality. Inequality may affect the quality of institutions. For example, 
high inequality will prevent the poor from investing in education or the ruling class may 
not invest in education so that the poor majority will not be politically active thus 
undermining the development of necessary social and political institutions. Keefer and 
Knack (2002) suggests that social polarisation negatively affects institutional quality. 
The countries with poor institutions are also likely to have high inequality. For example 
in Russia in the 1990s, a small group of entrepreneurs exploited their political power to 
promote their own interests, subverting the emergence of institutions committed to the 
protection of smaller share holders and businesses. According to the Corruption 
Perceptions Index published by Transparency International, among the transition 
economies, Estonia is placed 28, and Hungary 31; whereas Russia is placed 79, and 
Ukraine 83. In these transition economies, weak performance of public institutions, 
infringement of property rights in favour of influential parties, lower willingness to use 
courts to resolve business disputes, lower level of tax compliance and higher levels of 
bribery all have been strongly correlated with inequality (Hellman and Kaufman, 2002). 
Similarly, in several Latin American countries, the ruling elites, the military and large 
businesses impeded smaller business interests giving rise to significant informal sector. 
Chong and Gradstein (2004) show that when the political bias in favour of the rich is 
large, income inequality and poor institutional quality may reinforce each other, 
indicating endogeniety between the two.
There may also be inter-linkages between various institutions. For example, nearly all 
developed countries are democracies and most developing countries are either run under 
one party system, dictatorships or military regimes. The countries with lower levels of 
economic and human development tend to have lower levels of education, limited 
political rights, weak or non existent political competition, lower level of economic 
freedom and openness, ethno linguistic factionalism, the lack of judicial independence 
and a free press and high levels of permissiveness towards corruption.  
Institutions can be differentiated into four distinct categories: 1) Legal, 2) Political, 3) 
Economic and 4) Social. Legal institutions capture the transparency and fairness of legal 
system, political rights of the citizens, State legitimacy, freedom of speech, independence 
of judiciary, enforceability of contracts, police effectiveness, access to independent and 
impartial courts, confidence in judicial system in insuring property rights, prevention of 
improper practices in public sphere, control of corruption etc. Political institutions 
represent political stability, democracy, autocracy or dictatorship. Economic institutions 
include state effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue, 
states ability to create, deliver and maintain vital national infrastructure, states ability to 
respond effectively to domestic economic problems, independence of government 
economic policies from pressure from special interest groups, trade and foreign exchange 
system, competition policy, privatisation, banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, 
securities market and non bank financial institutions etc. Social Institutions capture socio 
economic conditions such as health, education and nutrition etc. 
The Legal, political, economic and social institutions are strong in developed countries 
and for developing countries there are mixed experiences. For example, intellectual 
property rights are protected vigorously in the US and most advanced societies, but not in 
many developing countries (Rodrik, 1999). Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) link the 
development of public education as a social institution to the democratization as a 
political process in US. According to them, while starting at about the similar level of 
development in the 18nth century, US led the way in setting up a system of common 
schools and promoting literacy, where as in countries in South America and the 
Caribbean these processes were much delayed. Gupta et al (1998) finds that if 
government officials use their authority for private gain and indulge in corruption that 
affects the effectiveness of social spending and the formation of human capital by 
perpetuating an unequal distribution of asset ownership and unequal access to education. 
Corruption also affects the government effectiveness as it weakens tax administration and 
can lead to tax evasion and improper tax evasion and improper tax exemptions. Higher 
corruption is associated with increases in inequalities in education, land distribution and 
health spending. Wealthy urban elites can lobby the government to bias social 
expenditure toward higher education and tertiary health, which tend to benefit high 
income groups (Ibid, 1998). 
Furthermore, trade opening in societies with weak institutions may lead to worse 
economic policies. For example, those transition economies where trade reforms were 
implemented slowly and the government institutions were able to perform well with time, 
smaller increase in inequality and smaller output decline is occurred. However, the 
transition economies with weak government setups have performed as ‘passive 
globalizers’ and the trade-to-GDP ratios in them were quite high, partly accounting for 
capital flight, while poverty and inequality was increased (Yudaeva, 2002). 
3. What Do We Find?
Mamoon (2007) examines how legal, economic, political and social institutions fare with 
different measures of inequality in a cross section framework. Among legal institutions, 
rule of law and control for corruption have a stronger impact on inequality than voice and 
accountability. We find that countries which practice democracy are less prone to 
unequal outcomes especially when it comes to wage inequality and income inequality 
whereas autocracy is associated with higher level of wage inequalities but its impact on 
income inequalities are insignificant. Though under good economic management, 
autocracies may redistribute incomes from the richest to the poorest, more generally an 
autocratic set up violates the median voter hypothesis.  The results also show that 
political stability is more sensitive to inequalities than democracy and autocracy which is 
to say that the countries which are politically stable also form more equal societies. 
Though in a cross section analysis, our results indicate average sample characteristics of 
countries chosen which neutralise the single country case sensitivities and thus may have 
captured the simple observational analogy that most democracies in the world are also the 
ones which are politically stable and economically efficient whereas most autocracies, 
unless they are lead by enlightened leadership eventually suffer from unstable or 
repressed political systems. Economic institutions also play an important role in 
alleviating global inequalities. Whether the government is functioning effectively and 
whether it has a robust fiscal and monetary policy seems to have stronger impact on 
inequality than regulatory quality. Education for all, a proxy for social institutions, has a 
strong redistributive power. If education is more equally distributed among the 
population, relative wages of skilled and unskilled labour will have least amount of 
distortions especially when the country opens up to international trade. Overall, political 
stability, control for corruption and rule of law trumps any other institutional proxy in 
reducing inequalities in a country. On the other hand, middle income group is most likely 
to benefit from good functioning institutions than any other income group. 
Regarding integration the paper finds that openness is generally related with higher wage 
inequality, though its impact on income inequality is insignificant at best. This result is 
also in line with recent literature. However we also find that level of openness or trade 
policies may carry significant positive effects in widening the wage gaps between skilled 
and unskilled labour. The reason for the continuous failure of WTO talks has also been 
supported by our study as our results show that opening up of protected sectors to 
increased international competition by revoking import taxes lead to higher wage 
inequality. The paper recommends more regional trade where by developing countries 
trade among each other if due to protection their exporting capabilities to the developed 
countries have been strangled especially in case of agriculture produce. For example, in 
countries like China and India, the pace of development suggests that both countries are 
fast climbing the technology ladder and would form significant pockets of services sector 
oriented high technology dependent production areas which may draw similarities with 
developed nations in both supply and demand and relative factor prices. Trade within 
developing countries may seek to exploit such emerging pockets.  Countries like Pakistan 
may also increasingly join in if regional economics is put on priority and conflict of 
interest are resolved or set aside for preparing economic grounds for social harmony 
within their populations. 
The arguments in this article are based on detailed empirical research reported in the paper:  
‘Good Institutions and Fair Trade: A Road Map to Local and Global Social Harmony’ Working 
Papers - General Series 450, Institute of Social Studies., The Netherlands, 2007 
http://adlib.iss.nl/adlib/uploads/wp/wp450.pdf
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